Introduction
Over the past two decades there has been significant growth in the use of information disclosure programs in regulatory policy. The oldest such regulation in the United States may be the requirement that firms disclose financial information to investors. Other examples include food safety and nutrition labeling, as well as a growing number of environmental information disclosure regulations. Although the use of information disclosure policies in the environmental policy area is on the rise, the effects of such programs on environmental quality are unclear. A fuller understanding of how regulated entities respond to environmental information disclosure is critical in any economic assessment of these initiatives.
Drinking water quality is one area in which information disclosure regulations have been used in concert with traditional command-and-control regulations. In the United States, nearly 270 million people obtain piped water from 53,000 community drinking water systems. 1 The federal government regulates water quality in these systems under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). During the early 1990s, the number of contaminant regulations with which systems had to comply under the SDWA rose sharply, from 31 in 1990 to 83 in 1995, raising compliance costs significantly. 2 Partly in response to concerns regarding "unfunded mandates," the federal government heavily subsidizes compliance with the SDWA. Between 1995 and 2003, Congress appropriated $1 billion each year for the drinking water state revolving loan program, which authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to make annual capitalization grants to states, against which systems may borrow at below-market rates for treatment and distribution infrastructure improvements. Nonetheless, U.S. community water systems incur tens of thousands of violations of SDWA regulations each year [2] . 3 The 1996 Amendments to the SDWA mandated that community drinking water systems issue annual consumer confidence reports (CCRs) to their customers. The CCRs summarize information regarding the source of drinking water, any detected contaminants, and any violations of health-based drinking water regulations and procedural regulations (e.g., requirements for timely testing). The CCRs were first issued in 1999, reporting violations from the 1998 calendar year. The CCR rule was one of many "right to know" provisions enacted during the 1980s and 1990s. Testimony by U.S. Representative Henry Waxman stated the underlying goal of the approach in this case: "Under current law the public has no information about the presence of serious contaminants in their drinking water. Every year millions of Americans unknowingly drink tap water contaminated with cryptosporidium, carcinogens, and arsenic. If we can't prevent this contamination, we should at least give our constituents the ability to protect themselves [3] ." Arguably this disclosure regulation achieved an important public policy goal simply by providing consumers with important information about the quality of the drinking water they purchase. In this paper, we go further to examine whether this regulation actually provided additional benefits by reducing violations among regulated water suppliers.
We evaluate whether the CCR rule altered the behavior of water suppliers, using panel data for 517 water suppliers in Massachusetts from 1990-2003. We exploit two main sources of variation in information disclosure. First, disclosure varies over time -the reporting requirement is only in place for the last six of the 14 years in our data. Second, while all systems must compile a CCR beginning in 1998, the method of disclosing information to consumers varies by system size. In particular, suppliers serving 10,000 or more people must mail their CCR directly to households, and smaller community suppliers must post the CCR in a public place and make it available on request, but may waive the mailing requirement. This second source of variation in the "intensity" of information disclosure is critical to our identification strategy.
We find strong evidence that utilities required to mail CCRs directly to customers had lower violations after the CCR rule took effect. The magnitude of this effect is quite significant.
On average in our sample, large water suppliers incur about one violation every two years before 1998. Our linear and count data models suggest that mailing CCRs reduces total violations for this group by between 30 and 44%, and reduces health violations by 40 to 57%. The requirement to mail information to consumers appears to reduce the annual probability of positive violations (both total and health violations) in the sample by about 50%. In Section 2,
we provide some policy background information. Section 3 describes related literature. We present our econometric models in Section 4 and describe the data in Section 5. Section 6 reports results. We conclude in Section 7.
Policy Background
The SDWA Amendments of 1996 included four principal components. The method of releasing CCRs to the public differs with the size of the water system.
Systems serving more than 100,000 users must mail CCRs directly to consumers and post them online. Systems serving between 10,000 and 100,000 users must mail the reports directly to consumers but may forgo online posting. Systems serving between 500 and 10,000 users can, with the permission of the Governor of their state, publish the CCR in a local newspaper in lieu of direct mailing. Systems serving fewer than 500 users, with permission of the Governor, can simply provide notice to their customers that the report is available upon request.
There are also some differences in CCR requirements for utilities that purchase water from other sources. Water wholesalers must conduct all point-of-entry testing and provide information on violations and detectable contaminant levels to purchasing systems by April 1 (for data covering the previous calendar year). Purchasing systems must then supplement these data with information on their own tests from the distribution system (for example, they must test for lead in the distribution system because water pipes are the primary source of lead), and all violations at both the wholesale and retail level are reported to consumers in the July 1 CCR, which is generally mailed by the entity responsible for billing.
Two issues arise in thinking about the effect of the CCR rule as a regulatory treatment.
First, to what extent did utilities anticipate the requirements for public disclosure before the rule took effect? The rule was passed in August 1996. The first CCRs were issued by October 1, 1999 for violations during the 1998 calendar year. 6 Utilities may have anticipated and responded to the requirements prior to January 1, 1998. However, we do not believe that the anticipation effect was strong, and evidence suggests that utilities were not anticipating the disclosure rule much before the Amendments were passed and signed in 1996. 7 In our primary models we use 1998 as the first "treatment" year. If systems anticipated the requirements in advance and reduced violations before 1998, our models will underestimate the CCR's effect.
The second issue is whether other changes in the SDWA or in enforcement may have coincided with the CCR rule, potentially inflating our treatment effect estimate. However, the bulk of the legislative changes contained in the 1996 amendments addressed procedural issues on how EPA set new drinking water standards. The requirement to do source water assessment was unlikely to have immediate impacts. States were first required to develop a plan to conduct their source water assessments, to be submitted and approved by EPA by 1999. States then had two years to complete the assessments and could receive an additional 18 month extension. But a completed assessment is not the same as source protection activity. EPA views these assessments as the first step toward source water protection with a goal of having full source water protection for 60% of the population by 2005 [4] . We do not expect the existence of the state revolving loans to have had a significant impact on drinking water violations as the vast majority of money (96%) from state revolving loans went to fund improvements in waste water treatment [5] . We have also engaged in discussions with regulators regarding whether significant changes in enforcement or penalties occurred during this time frame, particularly in 1998, and they have assured us that no major changes took place. 8 
Related Literature
The literature on information disclosure as a policy instrument covers widely disparate types of information disclosure regimes. We categorize information disclosure programs by the nature of the good about which information is being disclosed.
Information disclosure about public goods
Many information disclosure programs have been developed to inform consumers about the public benefits of particular actions. For example, green marketing and eco-labeling programs have been developed to help consumers recognize private products that are bundled with public goods provision such as species preservation and pollution reduction. Consumers may have preferences over how their consumption choices affect the provision of these public goods, and an information program helps them tailor their consumption patterns to match those preferences. The key, however, is that the private goods they are consuming are of essentially the same quality regardless of whether those private goods are bundled with public goods.
The literature on public benefit disclosure programs includes a number of theoretical explorations [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . Empirical studies of the effects of such programs include analyses of the labeling of dolphin-safe tuna [11] and shade-grown coffee [12] , as well as disclosure of the percent of renewable sources comprising total energy supply by electric utility providers [13] .
The findings from the literature on this class of information disclosure problems suggest that mandatory information disclosure can change consumer behavior and can result in improvements in environmental performance, particularly among larger firms that produce goods sold directly to consumers. 
Information disclosure about private goods
Information disclosure programs also have been developed to inform the public about private benefits and costs of their actions -the health effects of direct consumption of a good, for example. The SDWA information disclosure regulation that we assess here falls into this category. The provision of information about tap water quality is a public good, but the benefits received from the information accrue to households in private fashion. 12 Other examples in this category include nutritional labeling, cigarette warnings, and organic food labeling when consumers perceive private health benefits of consumption.
The oldest strain in the literature on private benefit disclosure programs concerns the effects of mandated disclosure of firms' financial information to investors on market returns [24] [25] [26] [27] . Mandatory food safety labeling, such as mercury advisories for fish consumption [28] , nutrition labeling [29, 30] , the surgeon general's tobacco warning label [31, 32] , and HIV/AIDS education [33] are other examples that have been examined empirically. 13 Two recent studies link drinking water quality information disclosure to impacts on consumer behavior. One study estimates the response of well water users in Bangladesh to information provided on the level of arsenic in the well [36] . Another randomly assign households in Delhi, India to receive information on whether their drinking water tested positive for fecal contamination and test for any effect of this information [37] . 14 The findings from the literature on these types of information disclosure programs indicate that consumers who will receive private benefits from quality or hazard labeling react rationally to such information in many, but not all, cases (reducing consumption of "bads" and increasing consumption of "goods"). To our knowledge, there is no previous research linking these kinds of regulations to producer behavior. This is the purpose of our analysis.
Ways in which information disclosure might influence firms' behavior
The mechanisms through which information is expected to influence behavior can be grouped into three broad categories. The first category is the market mechanism [39] . If information about firms' environmental performance is known and market participants (such as consumers, investors, and employees) have preferences over environmental performance, firms can face market pressure to improve performance [40] . The second category is the political mechanism; people may use the political system to lobby for more stringent regulation, or to protest particular production practices [41, 42, 38, 15] . Finally, information disclosure programs can affect the internal decision making of an organization. The act of measuring and reporting data on environmental performance may itself lead to internal changes at the firm that improve environmental performance [14] .
It is useful to examine these three potential mechanisms with regard to the SDWA policy we assess here. The market mechanism is likely not relevant in this case, as there is essentially no market through which consumers can respond to information provided by their water supplier.
The only potential response that would be reflected in a market is if customers moved to an area served by a different water supplier and we do not expect this reaction to be significant. 15 The internal mechanism is also unlikely to play a large role for the CCR rule because water suppliers are already required to monitor and report any violations to the state DEP. So compiling these data for their customers should not be providing the water supplier with information it did not already have. Of the three potential pathways for information disclosure to influence the behavior of regulated entities, the political mechanism is the most likely in this case. We will address this issue when we interpret our results, but will not formally model the mechanism through which disclosure may affect water suppliers' behavior.
Information disclosure and social welfare
We end this section with an important caveat about social welfare. The literature on ecolabeling suggests that providing information about the provision of a public good can, in theory, have either positive or negative effects on both environmental quality and, more generally, social welfare [6, 7] . Analysts have only recently begun to explore the welfare implications of the class
of information disclosure that we analyze here [43] , but implications thus far are similar to that in the eco-labeling case -it depends. It is certainly possible that the costs of such programs exceed their benefits.
In the particular case addressed in this paper, the benefits of reducing violations depend critically on the type of violation and the contaminant. Some violations are likely to be associated with very low damages (failure to file a report on time) while others may be associated with acute or chronic health damages. The costs of information disclosure also vary widely by system size. EPA estimated that the national costs of compiling and mailing the CCR are on the order of $21 million with the average annual cost per supplier varying from $50 for small systems to more than $3000 for larger systems. 16 Furthermore some drinking water contaminant standards may be set low enough that their social costs exceed their social benefits. 17 If the standards in place have net social costs, and information disclosure about violations and contaminant levels causes regulated suppliers to further reduce contaminant levels below the inefficient standards, the marginal costs of each such reduction exceed the marginal benefits, and the program as a whole may diminish social welfare.
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A full exploration of the welfare implications of the SDWA information disclosure requirement is beyond the scope of this analysis. However, we achieve what would be the necessary first step in performing a benefit-cost analysis of the regulation -measurement of its impacts on the compliance behavior of regulated water suppliers. Further work on the regulation's impact on consumers and other factors is an intended area of future research.
Econometric Models
Our econometric approach to assessing the impact of information disclosure on drinking water violations is a set of difference-in-differences models that exploit variation in disclosure over time, examining data before and after the implementation of the regulation to identify its effect, and also spatial variation created by the system size threshold for mailing CCRs. 19 Alternative approaches are discussed in Section 6.3. We will begin with the simplest linear difference-in-differences model (1) 
The parameter θ is the difference-in-differences estimate (2):
We follow this with a series of panel data difference-in-differences models designed to control for supplier heterogeneity and the time trend in violations and to account for the correlation of violations within suppliers over time. The first panel equation to be estimated is (3), a linear model. We estimate each of the panel data models with V equal to total violations by supplier i in year t , and also with V equal to annual health violations.
There are a number of important changes on the right-hand side of (3), relative to (1). First, we add a supplier fixed effect (u i ); as a result we can no longer separately identify γ from (1).
Second, we add a series of year dummies (d t ); as a result, we can no longer separately identify α from (1). We will estimate some models in which the set of year dummies are replaced by a polynomial time trend, so that we can estimate α, but even in these cases the pure effect of the CCR on violations will be confounded with the effect of being post-1998.
Finally, we might be concerned that the specification in (1) cannot distinguish the effect of mailing the CCR (which is a function of serving more than 10,000 households) from other potential interactions between reporting and system size (for example, related to administrative sophistication). To address this we add a polynomial function of CCR interacted with system_size (a continuous measure of a supplier's population served) to equation (3) . The direct impact of system size on violations cannot be identified separately from u i , but including a flexible function of the interaction terms of CCR and system_size ensures that our estimate of θ will isolate changes in violations only in the vicinity of the mailing threshold. The difference in differences in mean outcomes (4) is now a function of θ and δ:
However, the parameter of interest is still θ, which represents the difference in differences in mean outcomes adjusted for mean differences in system size away from the 10,000 person threshold (5):
In all of our linear panel data models we cluster standard errors by supplier to account for serial correlation.
Violations are discrete, infrequent events; V is equal to zero most of the time and cannot be negative. Thus, we also estimate panel Poisson models (6), obtaining parameter estimates by maximizing the corresponding log-likelihood function. Negative binomial models are also estimated, relaxing the Poisson's assumption that the conditional mean is equal to the conditional variance. 
We also estimate a set of logit models, with a binary dependent variable equal to one if we observe one or more violations for supplier i in year t and zero if not. We estimate the parameters in (7) by maximizing the corresponding log likelihood function. a difference in raw means that is significant at the one percent level. Raw mean total violations increase for smaller suppliers after information disclosure, and the difference is significant at the five percent level. If we take the difference in these differences in raw means, we obtain -0.20, implying a potential treatment effect (reduced violations) from mailing CCRs directly to consumers of about one-fifth of a violation per year.
Health violations are the sum of actual MCL violations and drinking water treatment technique violations that represent a threat to public health. Like total violations, mean health violations are lower after the regulation than before for suppliers serving more than 10,000
people (significant at the five percent level). For smaller suppliers, the observed increase is also significant at the five percent level. The difference in differences in raw means, -.07, implies a small potential reduction in health violations from mailing CCRs directly to consumers. so that it is possible to see any apparent change in violations between the two years around the 10,000-person mailing threshold. 23 In 1997, the year immediately preceding mandatory disclosure, violations trend upward for systems serving between 4,000 and 15,000 people. In 1998, violations rise from 4,000 to 10,000, then drop quite steeply at the CCR mailing threshold, staying below or approximately equal to 1997 violations for larger systems. Though we cannot draw any causal inference from the graph, visually it appears as though violations for systems near 10,000 may be affected by information disclosure. This is consistent with the observed drop in raw mean violations for larger systems in Table 1 , and it is the effect we will seek to identify econometrically.
The independent variables of greatest interest identify supplier-years in which information disclosure is required, and supplier-years in which information must be mailed directly to consumers. An annual CCR is required in about 45% of supplier-years in our data.
Mailing a CCR directly to customers is required in about 14% of supplier-years. The average Massachusetts water supplier serves about 18,000 people. Most are publicly-owned (about onethird are private), and 19% purchase some or all of their water supply from a wholesale water provider. Surface water is a primary source for almost one-third of water suppliers; the rest use primarily groundwater. Table 2 reports results from the estimation of linear models, in which the dependent variable is total annual violations. We begin by estimating equation (1) in column (1), pooling the cross-section and the time series, and regressing violations on CCR, CCR_mail, and
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Models of total violations
lg_supplier. This simple difference-in-differences model is essentially what we have done in
Section 5 by taking the difference in differences in raw means between large and small suppliers, pre-and post-1998, and the result is similar; mailing CCRs appears to cause large suppliers to violate less often (by about one-fifth of a violation per year). 24 In column (2), we add a supplier fixed effect (so we can no longer identify the impact of serving more than 10,000 people). 25 For suppliers large enough to trigger the mailing requirement, disclosure reduced annual drinking water violations by about 0.17 violations, about 36% of mean annual violations (0.47) by large suppliers pre-1998.
We estimate equation ( Table 3 provides an additional layer of detail, first regressing the year dummies from column 3 of Table 2 on CCR and Num_MCLs, and then regressing the (unreported) supplier fixed effects from column 3 of Table 2 on supplier characteristics. 27 With a very small number of observations on the dependent variable (14 years), the sign on Num_MCLs is positive, and the sign on CCR is negative, but neither coefficient is statistically significant. Supplier characteristics may play a role. Controlling for a supplier's source basin, publicly-owned suppliers on groundwater violate less often than their private counterparts; the opposite is true for suppliers on surface water. Larger groundwater suppliers violate more often than smaller groundwater suppliers, but there is no effect of system size for surface water suppliers. All else equal, surface water suppliers violate less often than groundwater suppliers, but this effect is reduced for larger suppliers. This seems anomalous, since surface water sources are significantly more vulnerable to contamination from runoff, but the surface water dummy variable may be collinear with source basin and other covariates in the model.
Models of health violations
We also estimate the panel data models with the more severe health violations, rather than total violations, as the dependent variable. Health violations are infrequent; about 92% of supplier-year observations on this variable are zeros, and another 6% are ones. The linear models in Table 4 suggest that mailing CCRs directly to customers results in reduced violations of about 0.08 per year, a 40% reduction in pre-1998 mean annual health violations by large suppliers. The Poisson model suggests a reduction in violations of 57% when CCRs must be mailed. 28 The time dummies in all models capture the annual trend in health violations we see in 
Models of the probability of positive violations
Our final set of panel data models allow us to estimate the effect of the requirement to mail CCRs on the probability of positive violations. 30 Table 5 reports odds ratios from four fixed-effects logit models. We report two models for total violations, one with a quadratic time trend (column 1) and one with annual dummies (column 2). We also include the results of two health violations models, one with a quadratic time trend (column 3) and one with dummies for each pair of years (column 4). In each of these four models, the requirement to mail CCRs directly to households has a negative and significant effect on the probability of positive violations, reducing the probability of nonzero violations (and of nonzero health violations) by about one-half. 31 
Robustness checks and alternative models
The key identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences estimation is that in the absence of treatment, the trends in violations would have been parallel for large and small suppliers, those who do and do not have to mail the CCR. One way to test the reasonableness of this identifying assumption is to determine whether, in fact, there are significant differences in the differences in violations between the two groups pre-treatment. If there are, then the difference-in-differences estimators are unlikely to yield valid causal estimates.
We use data on violations in the pre-treatment period, 1990-1997, when CCRs were not required, to run falsification tests of our identifying assumption, reporting results in Table 6 .
First, we generate a proxy policy variable (proxy policy 1) that takes a value of 1 in the years 1996 and 1997 for large suppliers only. We then run a panel difference-in-differences model using proxy policy 1 as a false treatment variable (column 1). We run the same test using proxy policy 2, a variable that takes a value of 1 in the years 1994-1997 for large suppliers in column 2.
In each specification the proxy policy variable is not statistically significant. Pre-treatment, there is no statistically significant difference in the differences in violations among large and small water suppliers. This increases our confidence in the validity of our causal estimates.
A second concern about our estimation strategy is that the observed pattern in violations An alternative quasi-experimental approach that would appear to be a natural fit for this particular policy is a regression discontinuity (RD) design. An RD model would assume that water systems very near 10,000 are similar in all respects except for the requirement to mail the CCR above the threshold. Suspecting that the CCR mailing threshold was not deterministic, we collected data on whether suppliers actually mailed their CCR in each year, 1998-2003, available in paper and microfiche files at the Massachusetts DEP. 32 We then implemented a fuzzy RD model, using CCR_mail as an instrument for actual mailing (CCR_mail_actual). Results are reported in Table 7 .
At first blush the RD model seems appropriate for this policy evaluation because treatment is determined by the size threshold. However, this approach has a number of weaknesses. Most obvious is the loss of power in comparison to the panel models. The fuzzy RD model must drop all systems except those in the neighborhood of 10,000 customers, since the instrument is valid only for these systems. In Table 7 , we make two different assumptions about the breadth of this neighborhood, but even using the most generous assumption, [6,000, 14,000], there are so few suppliers in this group that none of the parameter estimates are significant. Given the inclusion of a quadratic function of distance to the threshold, we cannot estimate a model with supplier fixed effects; instead we estimate annual models, 1998-2003, further reducing statistical power. 33 The panel model in column 7 is a random-effects model -a specification rejected by a Hausman test.
While we would have been pleased with regression-discontinuity results that support the panel model results, the panel models are preferable for two reasons related to research design.
First, as is obvious in Figure 2 , the effect of the CCR is likely to be identified only by exploiting the combination of time-series and cross-sectional variation in reporting. The RD model, by design, focuses only on the cross-section. Second, in the panel data models we borrow one of the auspicious aspects of the RD approach. Recall that we include a quadratic function of CCR*system_size in each panel model (and tested higher-order polynomials with no significant results). This allows the CCR_mail coefficient in these models to zero in on what is happening around the mailing threshold, rather than on other potential interactions between reporting and system size.
Conclusions
Taken together, our panel data models and robustness checks suggest that the requirement to disclose information on drinking water violations by mailing information directly to households on an annual basis reduced violations by Massachusetts water suppliers. The magnitude of this effect is quite significant. On average in our sample, large water suppliers incur about one violation every two years before 1998. Our linear models suggest that mailing CCRs reduces total violations in this group by about 44%, and health violations by about 40%.
For total violations, the count-data models suggest a somewhat smaller 30-38% reduction. The count-data models suggest that mailing CCRs generates a reduction in health violations of 57%.
The requirement to mail information to consumers appears to reduce the probability of positive violations (both total and health) in the sample by about 50%.
Our choice of very high-quality state data, rather than problematic national data on drinking water violations helps the internal validity of our results, though at the expense of external validity. Without further study, it is difficult to say how well our results will generalize to U.S. water suppliers nationwide. Nonetheless, we provide convincing evidence for the impact of this information disclosure policy in Massachusetts.
In order to understand these findings we reflect on the mechanisms (political, market, and internal) through which information disclosure can affect performance. Though we perform no tests of these pathways, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that the political mechanism is at work; water suppliers required to directly mail CCRs may experience, or expect to experience, a political response and may respond by lowering violations. We would not expect the market mechanism to work in this case, as there is essentially no market through which consumers can respond to information. The internal mechanism is unlikely, as well; water suppliers are already required to monitor and report any violations to the state, so compiling these data for their customers provides no information they did not already have.
This work adds considerably to the evolving understanding of the effects of information disclosure on environmental quality. There is significant movement in regulation at all levels toward "regulation by information". For the SDWA example we analyze, mandatory information disclosure complements, but does not supplant, existing pollution control regulations. This is not always the case, especially in developing countries. Further analysis of the effects of information disclosure on firms, consumers, governments and other institutions is an important area for future research. 
Neg Bin IRRs Average violations by system size, 1997 & 1998
Notes: Each point graphs the annual average number of violations for a group of approximately 4% of MA water suppliers (about 20 systems), by the midpoint population served in that group. The bin containing the 20 largest systems is excluded so that changes in violations can be observed around the 10,000-person CCR mailing threshold. The midpoint population served for this excluded bin is 1,030,500. 7 Legislative debate over amending the SDWA began as early as 1993, but there is no mention of a "right to know" provision in the legislative history or in industry publications or press releases until Rep. Waxman's May 1996 proposal. 8 Damon Guterman, Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection, personal communication, July 27, 2006.
9 Unless consumers or investors with an interest in this information live in the immediate vicinity of a reporting facility, the benefits of using this information to change consumption or investment activity contribute to a public good. 10 Findings suggest that firms whose TRI releases received media coverage experienced abnormal stock returns [17] and that firms in turn responded to these abnormal returns by reducing pollution [18] . 11 Still others have examined the characteristics of facilities and firms that make them more likely to reduce toxic chemicals in response to information mandates [22] [23] . 12 An exception would be a case in which a regulated supplier managed a surface water supply, and took steps due to information disclosure to improve source water quality. Such an effect could have positive externalities of a public nature, like improvements in species habitat. 13 See also [34, 35] .
14 One study examines consumers' comprehension of information in the CCRs that are the subject of this paper, finding that consumers are insensitive to the CCR's design and format [38] . 15 Households could, of course, switch to bottled water for drinking, but drinking water comprises such a small portion of total household water use in the United States that the market pressure exerted by this switch would be very small. We may explore this question and other potential consumer reactions in future research.
treatment effect in Massachusetts relative to other states, given education levels, although we cannot test this without replicating this analysis on high quality data for other states. 22 The number of MCLs increased from 31-90 over this time period. All contaminants with an MCL have direct health impacts, although the nature (acute versus chronic) and degree of those impacts vary. 23 There are 20 suppliers (out of 517) in this last bin, and the midpoint population served is 1,030,500. 24 In this and all remaining models, any estimate of the coefficient on CCR is confounded with the general time trend in violations. 25 A Hausman test rejects the specification of u i as a supplier random effect. 26 In addition, by estimating the model with supplier fixed effects, we have removed the most significant source of overdispersion -supplier heterogeneity. 27 To produce unbiased estimates, the second-stage models reported in Table 3 require independence of CCR, Num_MCLs, and the first-stage time dummies (for the model in row 1), and independence of supplier characteristics and u i (for the model in row 2). Thus, these secondstage models provide some of the detail that would appear in a random-effects model, but they are not free from all of the assumptions of a random-effects model. 28 The negative binomial fixed-effects model for health violations does not converge. 29 We also estimated second-stage models to explain some of the variation in supplier and year fixed effects. Publicly-owned suppliers appear to incur health-based violations more frequently than private suppliers (the opposite of the effect of system ownership on total violations). There are no other significant results to report from these regressions.
